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The Mediterranean Basin is the largest of five regions around the world that 
constitute, in aggregate, the Mediterranean Woodlands, Forests, and Scrub 
Biome under a commonly-used global ecological classification system. All of 
these regions – the Mediterranean Basin itself as well as the similar ecological 
regions in California, Chile, South Africa, and Australia – face severe ecological 
degradation, largely because of agricultural practices. Traditional nation-states 
cannot address this ecological crisis adequately. A new form of political 
organization – an “Eco-State” – can and should be established for this purpose. 
Doing so will require a reorientation of the centuries-old notion of sovereignty, 
a reorientation that is already underway in some respects. The Mediterranean 
Biome Eco-State would build on this momentum. It would hold binding 
authority over all ecological and agricultural aspects of the territories falling 
within its boundaries, thus exercising a form of blended sovereignty that it 
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would share with other authorities. This essay summarizes some key aspects of 
such a new Mediterranean Biome Eco-State.  
Key words: Mediterranean, sovereignty, environment, agriculture, international  
law, eco-state  
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This essay builds on proposals I have made in two recent publications. One 
of those publications – an article on how to address the current ecological crisis 
in the Mediterranean Basin – explains the benefits to be achieved from 
establishing a new multilateral institution that I call the Corporate Trust for 
Agro-Ecological Integrity in the Mediterranean Basin (Head et al. 2017, 119-
132). The other publication – a book on international law and what I refer to as 
“agroecological husbandry” – briefly discusses the notion of an “Eco-State” as 
a new form of policy-and-management entity designed to handle global issues 
of an ecological and an agricultural character (Head 2017, 373-374, 379-381). 
What I have not addressed in those earlier publications is specifically how the 
“Eco-State” idea would apply to the Mediterranean Basin and four other regions 
of the world that share the same ecological features that make the Mediterranean 
Basin so special. 
That is the goal of this short essay. Without repeating the points made in the 
earlier two publications mentioned above, I provide in the following pages a 
brief account of a “Mediterranean Biome Eco-State” (hereinafter “MBES”). In 
keeping with the nature of an essay, and with the kind permission of the 
Mediterranean Review editors, I keep footnotes to a minimum. 
I begin the essay with a definition of the Mediterranean Basin itself and a 
description of the other four regions of the world that share the Mediterranean 
Woodlands, Forest, and Scrub Biome as defined by the World Wildlife Fund. 
Then I explain how the MBES would, for ecological-protection purposes, 
combine all of those regions into a single legal entity with personality in 
international law similar to that of the two hundred or so Political States – often 
referred to (anachronistically) as “nation-states” – that we are familiar with in 
today’s world.  
In particular, I emphasize why developing such a new entity – this non-
territorially-contiguous “Eco-State” – is not only (i) increasingly necessary in 
order to combat the ecological degradation that Mediterranean ecosystems now 
face but also (ii) increasingly feasible as a political matter, since traditional 
notions of (political) state sovereignty are already being questioned and eroded 
around the world.  
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B. The Mediterranean Basin and the Mediterranean Biome 
 
B1. The Mediterranean Basin  
 
Although the Mediterranean Basin can be defined in countless ways, I use 
here an ecological approach to identify features that form natural divisions in 
the distribution of flora and fauna due to such factors as climate and soil 
composition. More specifically, my definition of the Mediterranean Basin 
draws from an effort of about fifteen years ago that was sponsored by the World 
Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) and was summarized in an article appearing in the 
journal BioScience (Olsen et al. 2001). Because the majority of the authors of 
the article were, at the time of publication, conservation scientists affiliated with 
the WWF, I refer to the classification system they described there as “the WWF 
classification system”.  
The WWF classification system identifies over 800 specific “ecoregions” 
in the world as a whole.1 About three dozen of these “ecoregions” belong to 
the Mediterranean Woodlands, Forest, and Scrub Biome. Under the WWF 
classification system, a “biome” is a major habitat type; it is an amalgamation 
of those ecoregions that share similar environmental conditions (temperature, 
precipitation, soil type, etc.) and that therefore contain similar patterns of 
biological complexity and similar communities and species of plants and 
animals (Head 2012, 5-6, 17-18).  
On that basis, I define the Mediterranean Basin broadly to include 
significant portions of roughly twenty countries, all surrounding the 
Mediterranean Sea, as depicted generally in Map 1. Nearly all of the areas 
within the black line on Map 1 are part of the Mediterranean Woodlands, Forest, 
and Scrub biome.2  
 
1 Each ecoregion is regarded as being separate, with specific territorial limits that are drawn on the 
basis of a combination of land cover, species, climate conditions, and several other factors (World 
Wildlife Fund. n.s. a). Other ecological classification systems have been prepared by other entities 
(Head 2012, 17-24).   
2 In addition to the Mediterranean Woodlands, Forest, and Scrub and the Mediterranean Sea 
ecoregions, the Mediterranean Basin includes a few small “Mediterranean conifer and mixed 
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Map 1. The Mediterranean Basin 3  
 
B2. Other regions encompassed in the Mediterranean Biome  
 
The Mediterranean Basin is only one of five regions of the world, however, 
that share a similar set of ecological conditions. Map 2 shows where the 
Mediterranean Woodlands, Forest, and Scrub Biome appears in California, 
Chile, South Africa, and Australia – as well as in the Mediterranean Basin itself.  
 
 
forests” ecoregions; these occupy the high mountain ranges in certain areas of North Africa and 
Spain (Global Species n.s.).   
3  Map 1 has been prepared by J. W. Head based on a combination of ecological, climatic, 
agricultural, and other factors, with special reference to the WWF classification system. With the 
exception of Portugal, the black line designating the territory I define as the Mediterranean Basin 
has been drawn to exclude any state that does not actually have some coastal territory on the 
Mediterranean Sea.   
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Map 2. Ecoregions in the “Mediterranean Forests, Woodlands, and Scrub” Biome 
(Terpsichores 2012a). 4 
 
Why are these maps significant? Partly because they show that as an 
ecological matter, the Mediterranean Basin can be regarded as nearly unique, 
differing from anywhere else in Europe in terms of the mix of climate, land 
cover, species diversity, soil type, and a cluster of other factors that are physical 
in character. The various Political States in the region – Italy, Greece, Turkey, 
Egypt, Morocco, and the others – all share this same nearly-unique cluster of 
ecological factors, which we may refer to more succinctly as the Mediterranean 
Biome. This sharing suggests that the careful ecological management and 
preservation could naturally, and most efficiently, be shared among those 
states.  
Map 2 is especially important in showing that although no other regions 
elsewhere in Europe constitutes part of this Mediterranean biome, four other 
smaller regions of the world located very far apart from each other do in fact 
 
4 A similar map, but showing existing boundaries of Political States, can be found at Tvpm 2005 
and is available for use under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License, version 2.1.  
As is more evident on that other map, the location of the biome in California extends slightly 
south into Mexico as well. 
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share (belong to) that same biome. Notwithstanding the political and social 
differences that exist between those various regions – between the Napa area of 
California, for instance, and the coastal regions of Tunisia – it would also seem 
sensible to create a system of shared responsibility for ecological management 
and preservation of this shared Mediterranean Biome, inasmuch as the 
ecological conditions within all five of them are so similar. Indeed, as a matter 
of rainfall, seasonality, soil type, land cover, species diversity, and other 
physical characteristics, these five parts of the Mediterranean Biome resemble 
each other much more than they resemble other parts of the (political) states in 
which they are currently located.  
 
B3. Ecological and agricultural issues in the Mediterranean Biome  
 
Creating some system of shared ecological management responsibility is 
particularly sensible because of the ecological degradation that afflicts all of 
these regions – none more severely than in the Mediterranean Basin itself. In an 
article I co-authored recently with two colleagues, I offered these observations:  
 
[N]early the entirety of the Mediterranean Basin . . . falls within one of those 
terrestrial areas around the world that the World Wildlife Fund has identified 
as the most critically endangered ecologically. This terrestrial eco-
degradation takes many forms. Several of them relate specifically to 
agriculture – which . . . has special significance to the economy and culture of 
the Mediterranean Basin (Head et al. 2017, 101-102). 
 
As further explained in that article, the terrestrial degradation in the 
Mediterranean Basin (that is, leaving aside the very extensive marine pollution 
and degradation) takes many forms. For example, pesticide and fertilizer use in 
agriculture has wrought havoc; dangerous levels of hexachlorocyclohexanes, 
such as lindane, are still found in the soil and coastal regions of the 
Mediterranean Basin despite the fact that they are no longer used. Biodiversity 
is threatened. For instance, the Northern bald ibis – one of the most critically 
endangered birds in the world – now has populations in only two locations 
worldwide, one in Morocco and one in Turkey. Large dam projects have 
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changed river flows, causing river-bed and river-bottom erosion, thus lowering 
the water table (which stresses plants and animals downstream); the Nile River 
is interrupted, for instance, by at least twelve large reservoirs and dams, 
including the Aswan High Dam, which traps 98% of the river’s sediment, 
decreasing soil productivity and depth downstream (Head et al. 2017, 103).  
Overall, the World Wildlife Fund reports that “[m]ost natural communities 
have been degraded or permanently altered throughout the Mediterranean basin 
. . . [mainly because of] continuing conversion to agriculture, pasture, and urban 
areas.” (World Wildlife Fund n.s. b).5 Likewise, the portions of California 
belonging to the Mediterranean Biome are classified as “Critical/Endangered”, 
also largely because of agricultural conversion (World Wildlife Fund 2001).6  
In our earlier article, my colleagues and I proposed a regional organization 
that could help address the agricultural and ecological problems in the 
Mediterranean Basin itself (Head et al. 2017, 119-132). What we did not do 
there, however, is to elaborate on a further step that I also propose here: the 
establishment of an “Eco-State” that would encompass not only the regions 
shown in Map 1, above, as falling within the Mediterranean Biome in Europe, 
the Middle East, and North Africa but also those other four regions of the world 
 
5  Other organizations echo this assessment. The wildlife charity Wildscreen reports that the 
Mediterranean Basin has “a ‘Mediterranean climate’, which describes the distinct, subtropical 
climate shared by five regions around the world” and which has made the Mediterranean Basin 
“one of the most biologically rich and complex regions on Earth” – but that pressure from its 455 
million residents and nearly 250 million annual tourists “is causing severe degradation of the 
Mediterranean’s natural environment, and only five percent of the original habitat remains 
unaltered.” (Wildscreen Arkive n.s.). 
6 The same is true of the 17,000 square mile ecoregion AA1210, the 76,000 square mile ecoregion 
AA1207, and the 44,000 square mile ecoregion AA1202 – all of these are located in southeastern 
Australia – as well as the 65,200 square mile ecoregion AA1209 in southwestern Australia and 
the 23,000 square mile ecoregion AA1203 in south central Australia. Indeed, of all the 
Mediterranean Biome ecoregions in Australia, only the 53,000 square mile ecoregion AA1201, 
in Western Australia, carries a classification of something less serious than “Critical/Endangered”; 
its classification is “Vulnerable”. Also classified as “Critical/Endangered” are all three 
Mediterranean Biome ecoregions in South Africa and the single Mediterranean Biome ecoregion 
in Chile. In nearly all of these ecoregions, agricultural conversion constitutes a principal cause of 
degradation (World Wildlife Fund n.s. c).   
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(as shown in Map 2) that share the same biome. It is that topic to which I turn 
now, beginning with the concept of an “Eco-State” as a new form of policy-
and-management organization designed for the express purpose of addressing 
global issues of an ecological and agricultural character.  
 
 
C. The concept of the Eco-State with blended sovereignty  
 
In order to address ecological and agricultural issues in all five regions of 
the world that constitute the Mediterranean Woodlands, Forest, and Scrub 
Biome, a new legal entity could be created that would share authority with the 
existing “Political States” (so-called “nation-states”) that currently hold power 
in these regions. Let me explain how as a historical and conceptual matter this 
new legal entity – which I refer to as the Mediterranean Biome Eco-State 
(“MBES”) – would combine all of those regions into a single legal entity, with 
personality in international law and a form of blended sovereignty aimed at 
agroecological integrity. 
My explanation revolves around two key propositions: (1) the concept of 
the “nation-state” – along with the concept of monolithic sovereignty that 
accompanies it – can be traced back several hundred years, but both of these 
concepts have become ever less useful and defensible, as shown in part by the 
rise of public international organizations, which now are recognized (like states 
are) as possessing international legal personality; (2) because neither of these 
two types of entities – that is, neither traditional “nation-states” nor public 
international organizations – has proven capable of preventing or overcoming 
severe ecological degradation (whether attributable to agriculture or energy 
production or some other human activity), we should create a new entity in 
international law – an Eco-State (distinguished from the traditional “Political 
State”) – whose definition and territorial reach would have ecological 
foundations, rather than historical or economic foundations, and whose 
emergence would represent a further move away from monolithic sovereignty 
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C1. The nation-state, monolithic sovereignty, and international organizations 
 
As I have recounted elsewhere, the modern state system swept across 
Europe from the 13th century onward and had firmly established itself as a 
political matter by the early 17th century (Head et al. 2017, 112). The legal 
question then rose as to what rules should guide the monarchs of Europe in their 
relations with each other. Several scholars addressed this question, but 
ultimately those of Hobbes, as posited in his book Leviathan (1651), prevailed, 
yielding a concept of sovereignty that was infused with absolutism – what I 
have called “thick” or “monolithic” sovereignty (Head et al., 2017, 113-114, 
citing Hobbes 1651).  
This “monolithic sovereignty” concept, which prevailed through the early 
20th century, has two particularly noteworthy features. First, it is territorial in 
its conception. Within a single (usually contiguous) physical territory, the 
government of a state is thought to have nearly unimpeded authority. Second, 
the “monolithic sovereignty” concept is national in its assertion (or pretension) 
that state territorial boundaries widely reflect “nationalities”, so that persons 
residing within State A are of one nationality and persons residing within State 
B are of another nationality. This assertion reflects in part the fact that the 
historical backdrop against which Hobbes drew up his vision of a Leviathan – 
a centralized state with concentrated legal and political power – was one of 
intense nationalism and of religious and ethnic conflict between different 
(perceived) nationalities (Head et al. 2017, 114).  
Indeed, in both respects – territoriality and nationality – the “monolithic 
sovereignty” concept reflects the peculiar historical circumstances of 15th-
century through 19th-century Europe. Today’s circumstances are dramatically 
different, of course, and the concept of state sovereignty has recently started to 
change in response to these differences. This change appears, for instance, in 
the emergence of a particular species of non-state entities: international 
organizations. Starting especially in the 1940s, an explosion of new 
organizations – the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, to name just three – emerged to address a range of issues concerning 
political, economic, environmental, military, research, diplomatic, and other 
forms of cooperation and authority. Most of them, moreover, involve limited 
transfers of sovereignty by their member states to the institutions themselves – 
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and the institutions are regarded as having legal personality in international law 
(Head et al. 2017, 119; Head 2017, 371-372).  
 
C2. Changing sovereignty to reflect reality  
 
I have emphasized above in subsection B3 that existing rules and 
institutions have failed to prevent or reverse severe ecological degradation in 
the Mediterranean Basin, and I have asserted that similar degradation threatens 
other regions of the world that also constitute constituent parts of the 
Mediterranean Biome. What different approach can be taken in order to address 
this failure?  
My position is that because neither of the two types of entities currently 
recognized as having legal personality in international law – that is, neither 
traditional “nation-states” nor public international organizations – has proven 
capable of preventing severe ecological degradation, a new entity in 
international law should be created. I refer to this new entity as an Eco-State in 
order to distinguish it from the traditional “Political State”.  
The definitional and territorial reach of an Eco-State would reflect only 
ecological factors (rather than historical or economic factors). It would draw 
from the scientific basis on which specific portions of the Earth’s terrestrial 
surface have been classified into biomes – and I have used the WWF 
classification system for this purpose.  
The emergence of the Eco-State as a concept, and the creation of an Eco-
State for each of the world’s biomes (the WWF classification system identifies 
fourteen different biomes) would represent a further move away from 
“monolithic sovereignty” and toward a pluralistic sovereignty that is blended 
and layered in nature. This move would reflect practical developments in many 
parts of the world where authority over various topics is already being shared 
among several entities. 
In the case of the region of Trentino-Alto Adige in northern Italy, for 
instance, a special division (or layering) of authority allocates most legislative 
and administrative powers to the two largely self-governing provinces that 
make up the region – namely, Trentino and South Tyrol. Hence, even though 
the roughly one million people of the region are Italian citizens, and Trentino-
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Alto Adige is unmistakably part of Italy, the exercise of sovereign control is not 
strictly territorial.7 Instead, it is “topical” in that sovereignty is allocated on the 
basis of topics or aspects (or subject-matter) of administration and operation 
(Head et al. 2017, 117).  
The world is replete with other illustrations of the same reality. The USA 
presents an obvious illustration: its federal-state composition involves extensive 
“layering” of legislative and administrative authority defined in constitutions 
and frequently erupting into disputes. Likewise, the European Union involves a 
layering or blending of sovereignty. A conference conducted in Trento in 2009 
highlighted many other such illustrations of layered or blended sovereignty, in 
which administrative and other forms of authority over certain territories has 
been allocated on the basis of the topics at issue – trade, currency, education, 
taxation, defense, and so forth. Such illustrations appear in Catalonia (in its 
relations with Spain), in Quebec (Canada), in Aceh (Indonesia), in Sabah & 
Sarawak (Malaysia), in Südtyrol (Italy), in Wales (UK), and elsewhere in the 
world. In all these cases, and numerous others, sovereignty is not territorially 
exclusive and absolute but rather layered, blended, shared, and mixed (Head et 
al. 2017, 117, citing Toniatti and Woelk 2017).  
It is this form of sovereignty that an Eco-State would possess. Specifically, 
the Mediterranean Biome Eco-State would be the manifestation of the Eco-
State concept in the Mediterranean Basin and the other four regions around the 
world that share the same ecological attributes. The MBES would share 
authority with Political States. Let me turn now to describe in more detail how 





7  For details about the administrative and legislative powers of Trentino-Alto Adige, see 
Autonomous Region of Trentino-Alto Adige. n.s. a. The special statutory foundation for these 
powers is found in the “Statuto Speciale di Autonomia per il Trentino-Alto Adige.” (Autonomous 
Region of Trentino-Alto Adige. n.s. b). 
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D. The Eco-State in practice: comparing the MBES with other 
international entities  
 
D1. A chaos of institutions 
 
Having summarized the concept of an Eco-State in general, particularly in 
contrast to the centuries-old concept of the nation-state – what I have referred 
to above as the “Political State” – now I turn to a more detailed account, with 
special attention to the specific Eco-State that would encompass all of the 
territories falling within the Mediterranean Biome. For that, I refer to Table 1 
and the following explanatory narrative – a main theme of which is that the 
world is already populated with a very wide variety of institutional entities, to 
which the Eco-State should now be added.  
In Table 1, the following abbreviations apply: ROK = the Republic of 
Korea; USA = the United States of America; ROC = the Republic of China 
(Taiwan); CA = California; NSW = New South Wales; EU = the European 
Union; UN = the United Nations; WTO = the World Trade Organization; “poli” 
= political; “econ” = economic; NGO = non-government organization; “comm” 
= commercial; “char” = charitable; “envir” = environmental; ICC = the 
International Chamber of Commerce; Gates = the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation; GP = Greenpeace; MBES = the Mediterranean Biome Eco-State; 
UNSC = UN Security Council; d = dues; f = fees; b = bonds; t = taxes; ICJ = 
the International Court of Justice; DSB = the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO. Most of those abbreviations appear in the column headings, where those 
abbreviations appear in brackets in order to give illustrations of the types of 
legal entities referred to in those columns. 
One overarching point that I wish to convey here is that developing such a 
new entity – this non-territorially-contiguous “Eco-State” – is not only (i) 
increasingly necessary in order to combat the ecological degradation that 
Mediterranean ecosystems now face but also (ii) increasingly feasible as a 
political matter, since traditional notions of state sovereignty are already being 
questioned and modified. An additional observation is also warranted: for 
several of the cells in Table 1, it is difficult to indicate whether the attribute is 
in fact present (signified by “YES”) or maybe present (signified by “???”) or 
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absent (signified by an empty cell). In a few particular cases, I have reflected 
this uncertainty by inserting a notation of “YES?”. In short, a broad diversity 
already exists in the real world of those entities that have prominence on the 
international stage.  
 
Table 1. Comparison of Eco-State features with the features of other entities 8 
 
 
8 For abbreviations used in Table 1, see preceding text.   
 




Although Table 1 is largely self-explanatory, several specific attributes of 
Eco-States do warrant special attention. These include territory, sovereignty, 
legal personality, financial stature, and rule-making authority. After discussing 
these issues briefly, I offer some observations on how the development of Eco-
States, such as the Mediterranean Biome Eco-State, can contribute to the 
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D2. Territory 
 
As shown on the first line of Table 1, an Eco-State would “have” territory, 
in the sense that it would exercise some aspects of control over an extensive, 
defined, physical terrestrial area.9 In this respect, an Eco-State will resemble a 
Political State such as Korea or Mozambique or Belgium or Japan.  
However, as reflected in the second line of Table 1, the territory of each 
Eco-State will be non-contiguous, and this distinguishes Eco-States from most 
Political States. Although the USA and Russia are two examples of Political 
States that do have non-contiguous territory (Alaska for the USA, the region 
around Kaliningrad for the Russian Republic), most Political States have 
territories that are contiguous. The reason every Eco-State will have a great deal 
of non-contiguous territory, of course, is that each one’s territory is determined 
entirely by ecological (not political) factors, and the combinations of climate, 
soil, and other factors making up a biome do, as a practical matter, “repeat” 
across continents. Map 2, above, shows the non-contiguity of the Mediterranean 
Biome. As a further illustration, Map 3 shows the “Temperate Broadleaf and 
Mixed Forests” Biome (according to the WWF classification system). Like the 
Mediterranean Biome, that temperate-forests biome exists in several territories 
on the surface of the Earth.  
In addition to non-contiguity, all Eco-States – including the MBES – would 
have another territorial attribute: non-rigidity. As climate change advances, the 
territorial boundaries of the Eco-States will tend to shift. The changing 
boundaries would continue to be determined on the basis of scientifically-
established criteria – a mix of rainfall, soil type, species diversity, temperature, 




9 For the present, I am concentrating only on terrestrial, not maritime, aspects of Eco-States. 
Questions would also arise regarding regulatory authority over ecological issues in the world’s 
maritime areas, such as territorial seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones.   
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These territorial features of Eco-States distinguish Eco-States not only from 
Political States but also from public international (intergovernmental) 
organizations, such as the IMF, the WTO, and the UN. Those entities do not 
“have” territory in anywhere near the same sense as a Political State has territory 
(notwithstanding the property rights that such organizations might claim over 
their headquarters and other small operational facilities). Likewise, an Eco-
State’s territorial features distinguish it from nongovernmental organizations 
operating at the international level. Table 1 refers directly to three such 
organizations: (1) the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) which has 
a commercial character, (ii) the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which has 
charitable purposes, and (iii) Greenpeace, which has an environmental focus. 
Numerous other entities could of course be added to the list in any of these three 
sub-categories of international nongovernment organizations – for instance, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) as another 
commercially-oriented entity, the Rockefeller Foundation as another charitable 
entity, and the World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) as another environmental-
Map 3. Ecoregions in the “Temperate Broadleaf and Mixed Forests” Biome  
(Terpsichores 2012b). 
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protection entity. Unlike any of those entities, each Eco-State would be 
territorial in character.10  
As a reflection of these commonalities among various segment of 
(noncontiguous) Eco-States, each such Eco-State would issue rules and 
directives that are binding within its territory. It would do so under authority 
that is independent of any authority retained by the Political States to issue rules 
and directives. That is, every Eco-State would, by the nature of its ecologically-
determined territorial reach, overlap in territory with several Political States. 
The authority of such an Eco-State to issue rules and directives would overlap 
with the authority on the part of several Political States also to issue rules and 
directives. The topics or subject-matter of the rules and directives, however, 
would differ: the Eco-State would be responsible for those rules and directives 
(and other attributes of governance) that relate to agricultural and ecological 
issues, while the Political State would be responsible for those rules and 
directives (and other attributes of governance) that relate to all other issues. 
An obvious question arises: how, as a practical matter, could lines be drawn 
to distinguish between agroecological issues and non-agroecological ones? This 
is not a trivial question, of course, but it is effectively the same question that 
arises routinely in any federal system in which some aspects of governance rest 
with a central political authority and other aspects rest with a subsidiary (or 
more than one subsidiary) level of authority. As I have explained in detail 
elsewhere (Head 2017, 381-382), the concept and practice of blended 
authorities and competences – what I have termed “pluralistic sovereignty” to 
distinguish it from the “monolithic sovereignty” that Hobbes and others would 
favor – can be seen as a commonplace feature of modern political life in nearly 
all societies. In other words, it would be a faint criticism indeed if someone were 
 
10 An Eco-State’s territorial character also distinguishes it from another type of entity that I have 
not included in Table 1 at all: the private-sector international corporation, such as Siemens or 
IBM or BP. Were I to include such entities in Table 1, the only “cell” that would have any notation 
in it would be in line (10), where a question mark could signify that in some cases a multinational 
corporation “is controlled by state government officials”; this would be the case, for instance, 
with some multinational corporations headquartered in China or Russia and operating 
internationally.   
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to claim that difficulties would arise in distinguishing between the competence 
of the Eco-State and the competence of those Political States whose territories 
overlap with that Eco-State. 
The sixth line in Table 1 also reflects the point explained above: unlike any 
nation-state, the authority of an Eco-State would extend over the territory of 
several Political States. This feature also distinguishes the Eco-State from all 
other entities of the types that I have included in Table 1, such as international 
organizations. For international organizations, jurisdiction to issue rules and 
exercise other aspects of governance applies (sometimes with some minor 
exceptions) to the entirety of the territory of each Political State that is a member 
of the organization. By contrast, hardly any Eco-State would exercise its 
agroecological jurisdiction over the entirety of the territory of any Political 
State. A few Political States in Africa might fall entirely within the territory of 
the Eco-State that encompasses the “Tropical and Subtropical Grasslands, 
Savannahs, and Shrublands” biome – but this would be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
In the MBES, then, authority to issue rules and directives over ecological 
and agricultural matters would rest with the MBES governing officials, acting 
independently of (and with no duty of loyalty or allegiance to) whatever 
Political State officials operate in the same territory for non-agroecological 
purposes. Issues regarding the selection and responsibilities of Eco-State 
officials are discussed below.  
 
D3. Legal personality 
 
As indicated in the ninth line of Table 1, each Eco-State would have 
personality in international law. This would put it on a par with every Political 
State, whose legal personality is implied as a bedrock principle of the 
international legal system. Through the process of recognition, the international 
community at large creates, or at least endorses the existence of, a Political 
State, in a way that is roughly analogous to the more explicit process by which 
public authorities (such as a secretary of state or minister of commerce) creates 
or endorses a corporate entity – this is called in some legal systems a “juridical 
person” – through prescribed formalities and documentation.  
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The fact that each Eco-State would have personality in international law 
would also put it on a par with such international institutions as the WTO. The 
WTO charter, by which that organization is created and governed, includes an 
express provision acknowledging that its member states recognize its status as 
a person in international law (World Trade Organization. n.s., art. VIII.1). In 
similar fashion, the establishment of the several Eco-States would be formalized 
and documented in a treaty with a similar provision recognizing the status of 
each as having international legal personality. I have proposed that this treaty 
would be the charter (that is, the founding document) of a Global Corporate 
Trust for Agroecological Integrity (Head 2017, 296, 299, 320, 324). 
The eleventh line in Table 1 reflects another especially important dimension 
of the Eco-State’s legal personality. As shown there, an Eco-State would differ 
from a typical international organization of the sort we are accustomed to (in 
the form of the UN, the WTO, and the World Bank, for instance) in the control 
to be exercised over it by Political States. Most existing international 
organizations are controlled firmly by their member states. Indeed, this reality 
forms the foundation for many criticisms leveled at those organizations, 
especially the ones operating under formal weighted voting systems that give 
some member countries much more “say” than other countries have in the 
organizations’ policies and practices (Head 2008, 233, 243-244, 271, 272). An 
Eco-State would, by contrast, have autonomous powers vis-à-vis any Political 
State. It would operate under the overall auspices of the treaty by which Eco-
States are created and governed – and that treaty itself would, under 
arrangements I have explored elsewhere, have not only Political States as 
participants but also a range of other non-state entities (Head 2017, 320). 
How would this unusually robust element of independence from Political 
States manifest itself in the context of the MBES? For one thing, it would place 
the MBES in a stronger position than that of the EU: whereas the EU is largely 
dependent on its member states for financial and political purposes, the MBES 
would be largely independent of those Political States in the Mediterranean 
Basin – and likewise from the Political States elsewhere in the world 
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D4. Financial status  
 
The twelfth line in Table 1 reflects some other important characteristics of 
Eco-States. As shown there, an Eco-State would differ from a typical 
international organization of the sort we are accustomed to (in the form of the 
UN, the WTO, and the World Bank, for instance) in its capacities to raise funds. 
In this respect, an Eco-State would be like a Political State, whose legal 
authority to impose taxes and fees, and/or to issue debt instruments, is 
unquestioned. This authority would make Eco-States more financially self-
sufficient than most international intergovernmental organizations, which 
typically rely heavily on their member Political States for financial stability.11  
How would these financial arrangements work in the case of the MBES? 
Persons (including businesses) located within the territorial boundaries of the 
Mediterranean Biome – in southern Europe, in the Eastern shore of the 
Mediterranean Sea, on the north coast of Africa, in much of California (and a 
small sliver of northwestern Mexico), in Chile, around Cape Horn in South 
Africa, and across some southern regions of Australia (see Map 2) – would pay 
taxes to the revenue authorities of the MBES. Those taxes would, in aggregate, 
fund a wide range of operations carried out by other MBES officials (or by 
private persons under the supervision of such MBES officials). Those MBES 
officials would be selected through broadly representative participation by 
constituents of the MBES. The operations of those MBES officials would 
include managing wildlife sanctuaries, converting to non-fossil-carbon energy 
sources, implementing a new non-growth and low-consumption economic 
model, and supporting agricultural reforms through ongoing research, 
conservation training, crop diversification, and the like. The fact that MBES 
 
11 Even those international organizations that rely mainly on issuing bonds, rather than imposition 
of taxes or fees, to cover their operational expenses – the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development comes to mind in this regard – still rely in important part on the fact that the 
bonds are backed by obligations of the member countries, especially those with convertible 
currencies. This backing is what allows the IBRD, for instance, to assure its bondholders that it 
will be able to make good on those bonds in case the IBRD encounters difficulty in servicing the 
bonds (The World Bank. n.s.).    
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taxpayers in California and Italy and Australia would support MBES operations 
in other portions of the MBES – along the north coast of Africa, for instance – 
would be both necessary and appropriate. After all, taxpayers in economically 
advantaged portions of Political States regularly pay for programs carried out in 
less-economically advantaged portions of those states. MBES tax revenues and 
expenditures would operate in the same manner. 
 
 
E. Eco-States as new creatures of international law 
 
As I noted out the outset, my aim in this brief essay is not to explore all 
elements of the Eco-State concept as a whole or of how the MBES in particular 
would operate. Accordingly, although Table 1 reflects several additional 
attributes not yet discussed above,12 I wish to turn now to this more general 
observation: because of the attributes that Table 1 shows for Eco-States – 
distinguishing them from Political States and also from the broad array of 
international organizations with which we are already familiar in the world – 
the Eco-State would constitute a new creature in international law. In this 
respect it would join Political States (which have been “subjects” of 
international law since their emergence in the 17th century) and international 
intergovernmental organizations (which have been “subjects” of international 
law since the middle part of the 20th century) – but the Eco-State would actually 
be stronger than the second of those two “subjects” of international law.  
Indeed, I wish to emphasize both (i) how Eco-States would have more 
territorial logic and stability, and therefore more legitimacy, than Political 
States, and (ii) how Eco-States would, like plants growing in a native prairie 
ecosystem, benefit collectively from their aggregate diversity. I examine those 
two points in turn. 
 
12 For instance, the last two lines in the table show that Eco-States, like Political States, would have 
robust ability to enforce the rules and directives that they issue. 
 
 
| John W. Head | A Mediterranean Biome Eco-State 1| 135 
 
E1. Legitimizing sovereignty through perenniality  
 
I have highlighted in another context the fundamental difference between 
grain agriculture based on annual plants and grain agriculture based on 
perennial plants (Head 2017, 138-139, 148-152). Wes Jackson’s 1980 book 
New Roots for Agriculture – a work that helped secure his McArthur “Genius 
award” – emphasized the promise that perennial grains hold for addressing 
some of the worst aspects of modern agriculture: if crop research could be 
directed toward perennials, whose firmly- rooted strength would protect the soil 
while producing adequate yields of grain, then agriculture could be made 
sustainable for the first time since the agricultural revolution of several thousand 
years ago. Jackson sought then, as The Land Institute has sought ever since, to 
make agriculture more ecologically legitimate by tying it back to the ecosystem 
from which it first arose (Jackson 1980, 1-4; Head 2015, 144-148).  
Now I apply the same reasoning to global governance regarding agriculture 
and environment. We could make sovereignty more legitimate by devoting 
adequate research toward developing the concept of the Eco-State as I have 
summarized it above – that is, a legal entity rooted not in the short-term ebbs 
and flows of political power (planted now, flourishing for a while, only to be 
“harvested” then and taken away) but rather in the long-term, perennial 
character of the natural ecosystems that define such Eco-States. In a rough 
analogy that I find useful, the Political State is like an annual plant; the Eco-
State is like a perennial plant. Applied to the Political State, the concept of 
sovereignty lacks legitimacy because (among other reasons) it boils down to 
human-centered political power, which is necessarily short-term. However, 
when the concept of sovereignty is applied to the Eco-State, whose territorial 
boundaries and authorities would be based wholly on ecological factors, that 
concept would gain legitimacy because (among other reasons) it rests on the 
processes and characteristics of the natural world, which is permanent on any 
time-scale that applies to the human species. 
To place this in the context of the Mediterranean Basin, which is famous 
for its ebbs and flows of political power: if the MBES can be developed along 
the lines I have proposed here, then a more legitimate and durable form of 
sovereignty can result. The sovereignty of the MBES will encompass authority 
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to issue and enforce agroecologically-related rules, to raise revenue and spend 
it on agricultural improvement, and to secure long-term loyalties of persons 
whose lives and livelihoods draw from, and participate in, a particular biome 
appearing not only in the Mediterranean Basin but also in four other regions of 
the world. 
I would emphasize again, though, that adequate research must be directed 
toward developing the concept of the Eco-State, which I have only outlined here 
in its general contours. In particular, many questions must be addressed about 
the definition, powers, and other features of the Eco-State and about the 
relations between Eco-States and Political States.  
One such question concerns a particular feature of the relationship between 
an Eco-State and a Political State that both exercise authority over the same 
territory: how would changes in the Political State (which are inevitable over 
time) bear on the Eco-State’s exercise of authority? After all, it is easy to 
imagine an especially strong and ambitious Political State leader (Italy’s 
Berlusconi comes to mind or even Germany’s Hitler) attempting a take-over of 
an Eco-State’s authority.  
Yes, these circumstances are easy to imagine, but it is also easy to remind 
ourselves of a precedent in which a seeming mismatch between competing 
claims of sovereignty survived such changes. In medieval Europe, before the 
rise of the so-called nation-state, territorial control frequently changed hands 
from one political claimant to another. Through the course of those changes, 
though, the authority of the (Catholic) church remained largely intact. One 
reason for this was that the underlying values espoused by all such claimants 
went largely unquestioned. While I would be among the last persons to praise 
the Catholic church for the form of governance it exercised then, the fact 
remains that a wide sharing of deeply-held, historically-conditioned attitudes 
about certain aspects of human existence served as a glue that for many 
centuries resisted dissolution as a religious matter in that part of the world. 
States came and went, but the church survived. In like fashion, a wide sharing 
of deeply-held attitudes about the sanctity of the Earth and the proper place of 
humans in it would serve as a glue that could secure the authority of Eco-States 
through the vicissitudes of Political States. 
A follow-up question is equally obvious: How are such “deeply-held 
attitudes” to be instilled? They evidently are not shared by many people in our 
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current day – otherwise the severe ecological degradation we see would not 
continue – so how can we imagine this new set of values to be brought into wide 
acceptance? 
One answer to this question would be to provide everyone with at least a 
basic grounding in Earth sciences – a part of what Wes Jackson of The Land 
Institute is fond of calling “ecosphere studies” and what I would refer to more 
broadly as ecosphere ethics 13  – so that people would understand the 
importance, both in their own ecoregion and for the world as a whole, of climate 
cycles, soil conservation, biodiversity, and the like. In the context of the 
Mediterranean Biome, for instance, I believe that widespread popular 
knowledge of such matters, along with an appreciation of their significance to 
human and planetary survival, is essential to the flourishing of human and other 
species in the special ecological setting shared by all of the territories that share 
the Mediterranean soil, climate, and land cover. Principle 14 of the Earth 
Charter reflects the importance of such a commitment to Earth-science 
education by positing in general terms that we should “[i]ntegrate into formal 
education and life-long learning the knowledge, values, and skills needed for a 
sustainable way of life”14 (Bosselmann and Engel 2010, 260).  
In a similar vein, there is another dimension to the analogy that I wish to 
draw here between perennials and annuals on the one hand and Eco-States and 
Political States on the other hand. Unlike Political States, whose governments 
typically regard the current generation of human beings within their territorial 
 
13 The Land Institute has sponsored three three-day conferences in 2015, 2016, and 2017 in order 
to explore the meaning and significance of “ecosphere studies”, and to organize educational 
initiatives that could encourage a world-view in which the ecosphere – as distinct from merely 
the biosphere (life on Earth) or the ecosystem (confined to a particular territory) – would be the 
primary frame of reference for policy-making.   
14 In a similar vein, the Preamble of the Earth Charter also asserts that “we must recognize that . . . 
we are one human family and one Earth community with a common destiny.” (Bosselmann and 
Engel 2010, 257). The Earth Charter was launched in 2000 at the Peace Palace in The Hague by 
the Earth Council in cooperation with Green Cross International and UNESCO. Although it does 
not take the form of a treaty and is not generally regarded as binding on its own in international 
law, some observers assert that it “is now widely accepted as a foundational document for future 
international law and global governance.” (Bosselmann and Engel 2010, 15).   
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boundaries as being the constituency whose interests they must pay most 
attention to, each Eco-State will have a broader and deeper set of constituents. 
The Eco-State’s constituents will be broader in the sense that they will include 
not just human beings but all other species and components of the ecosystems 
within the biome reflected in that Eco-State’s composition. Its constituents will 
be deeper in the sense that they will include not just those humans and other 
organisms that are alive today but also later generations of the species in those 
ecosystems. 
 
E2. Strengthening Mediterranean Biome sovereignty through diversity 
 
I have argued in the preceding paragraphs that sovereignty can be 
legitimized through “perenniality” – that is, by grounding it in the natural world 
with territorial boundaries of Eco-States, including the MBES in particular, that 
are drawn to reflect more or less permanent ecological realities, not temporary 
political artificialities. Now I assert that sovereignty can likewise be 
strengthened through diversity.  
What I mean by diversity in this context can be illustrated by offering 
another analogy to a prairie ecosystem. The diversity of species of grasses, 
legumes, and forbs in a natural grassland or prairie ecosystem provides strength 
against any number of threats and challenges. The threat of pathogens is 
relatively low because no one pathogen is likely to be successful in attacking 
multiple species; indeed, no one pathogen is likely to get enough food supply in 
a mixed-species grassland area, since no single host-plant species that it targets 
will predominate in that area. Compare this to a typical field of maize in a 
Missouri field or rice in a Korean agricultural landscape: any pathogen 
resourceful enough to break through the defenses that modern pesticides put in 
its way will sweep quickly through that densely-planted single-species field.  
Although there are obvious differences, I see important similarities between 
that image and the image of a single source of authority over a territory, as 
would be the case under Hobbesian “monolithic sovereignty” of the sort I 
described above in section C and have explored more fully elsewhere (Head 
2017, 359-363). Short of complete failure, but still devastating on the 
environment, are the countless instances in which Political States are unwilling 
or unable to protect natural resources against waste, degradation, or outright 
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destruction. I alluded above in section B to how this has occurred in the 
Mediterranean Basin. (Recall my explanation there that most natural 
communities throughout that region have been degraded or permanently 
altered, mainly because of continuing conversion to agriculture, pasture, and 
urban use.) 
By contrast, a system in which diverse structures and entities exercise 
governance over a territory can provide strength. Indeed, this is one reason 
favoring a federal system: some functions are best handled at the most local 
level; some functions are best handled at a higher, or the highest, level. 
Weaknesses in any level of government can sometimes be counterbalanced by 
other levels rising to the occasion as needs present themselves.  
Beyond that balancing function, diversity in governance can serve a fairness 
function as well. My earlier description of certain instances in which territories 
are subject to “blended sovereignty” or “layered sovereignty”, including the 
special autonomy arrangements for the Trentino – Alto Adige region in 
northern Italy, highlights the fact that such arrangements have been put in place 
in order to honor and preserve the linguistic, historic, cultural, and ethnic 
commonalities that people in one area share and that distinguish them from 
other groups included within the larger political unit.  
In the context of environmental protection, these values of diversity among 
the entities wielding authority also makes sense. Placing ecological management 
responsibility with one set of authorities and placing responsibility over non-
ecological matters with a separate set of authorities can add to, not detract from, 
efficiency. In the context of the Mediterranean Biome, placing ecological 
management responsibilities with MBES authorities and placing responsibility 
over other matters with the authorities of the pertinent Political States – Spain, 
Greece, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Chile, and so forth – can add 
to, not detract from, efficiency.  
I close this brief discussion of “Eco-States as new creatures of international 
law” with an observation about the structural character of Eco-States. Like a 
Political State of the sort we are familiar with in today’s world, an Eco-State 
would have local, intermediate, and central offices. For instance, the MBES 
would have local offices to manage the ecological-protection and agricultural-
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production affairs in each small region,15 and higher-level offices – probably 
one for the entire Mediterranean Basin area, another for California (and 
northwestern Mexico), another for Chile, another for the southern tip of South 
Africa, and one for the Mediterranean Biome territories in Australia – would 
coordinate the operations of those local offices. 
 
 
F. Concluding observations 
 
Ecological collapse threatens all of the five regions of the world that share 
the climate, soil, and land cover attributes of the Mediterranean Biome. My aim 
in this essay has been to propose a solution in international law to help address 
this ecological crisis. A Mediterranean Biome Eco-State could provide 
urgently-needed protection not only for natural systems of the Mediterranean 
Basin itself but also for those of the other four similar regions of the world – in 
California, Chile, South Africa, and Australia. While creating an Eco-State 
concept would introduce a new “creature” or “subject” of international law, 
doing so would not be unprecedented: it would echo the process by which 
public international organizations were accepted as “subjects” of international 
law in the 20th century – and indeed the process by which the Political States 
were accepted as “subjects” of international law in the mid-16th century. 
One particular appeal of Eco-States – including the MBES – is that they 
would have several strengths that are missing from international organizations 
and from Political States. Because their territorial authority would reflect more 
or less permanent ecological realities, not temporary political artificialities, their 
form of sovereignty would have more “perenniality”, of the sort that makes 
natural ecosystems strong. Likewise, by their contrast to existing types of 
 
15 These responsibilities might be allocated on the basis of the various ecoregions that the WWF 
has defined within each of the 14 terrestrial biomes, including the Mediterranean Biome. The 
development of increasingly sophisticated technology for monitoring ecological conditions and 
processes could allow for virtual, rather than actual, presence at the local level; this would keep 
the total number of local (ecoregion-level) office staff members relatively modest, but some 
would still be necessary.   
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international entities enjoying legal personality, Eco-States would also add an 
element of diversity – also a feature of strong natural ecosystems. 
A likely response to the proposals I have summarized above is that they are 
too ambitious, especially in an age marked by political gridlock, international 
conflict, and institutional sclerosis. However, it seems inevitable that changes 
will occur – in environmental awareness, in political ideology, in international 
legal structures – and what really is at issue is how the change will occur and 
specifically how we can influence its content, pace, and direction.  
Moreover, the legal reforms summarized above are not unprecedented. The 
past century alone has seen changes in international law and institutions that are 
just as substantial as the ones required today to bring a new regime of ecological 
protection and agricultural reform to the Mediterranean Basin and the other four 
regions in the world that we now find in crisis. In my view, then, it is 
shortsighted to plead that the initiatives outlined here are too ambitious, or that 
they are too inconsistent with existing legal doctrines or entrenched political 
interests, or that a “Plan B” should be designed and held in reserve in case these 
initiatives cannot prevail over the status quo. Indeed, a more potent critique of 
the proposals I have summarized in this essay might be that they are not 
innovative enough to protect these ecosystems for future generations of humans 
and other species.  
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